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MORE THAN A PIECE OF PAPER: SAME-SEX PARENTS AND
THEIR ADOPTED CHILDREN ARE ENTITLED TO EQUAL
PROTECTION IN THE REALM OF BIRTH CERTIFICATES
SHOHREH DAVOODI*
INTRODUCTION
Both the proponents and opponents of same-sex marriage have kept
the controversial topic in the United States spotlight for several years. The
beam of that spotlight widened further after the Supreme Court decided
both United States v. Windsor and Hollingsworth v. Perry in the 2012 term.
While the inequalities experienced by gays and lesbians have begun to
appear on the front page with increasing regularity, the public is paying less
attention to the struggles of their children.
The patchwork of laws regarding the status of same-sex relationships
in the United States can be difficult to traverse for gay parents and their
children.1 The number of gay and lesbian parents in the U.S. continues to
increase, making the lack of uniformity in laws particularly problematic.2
In the United States, it is estimated that there are at least 125,000 same-sex
couples raising nearly 220,000 children.3 Of those, more than 16,000 samesex couples are raising approximately 22,000 adopted children.4 In fact,
same-sex couples with children are four times more likely to raise an
adopted child than heterosexual couples with children.5

03/25/2015 13:32:44
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* The author would like to thank Professor Kathy Baker for suggesting this topic and supplying numerous ideas and revisions throughout the writing process. The author would also like to thank Jason
Cairns for his unwavering love and support.
1. See Lissette Gonzalez, Comment, “With Liberty and Justice for All [Families]”: The Modern
American Same-Sex Family, 23 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 293, 322 (2011) (“The law as it pertains to samesex parents is made up of complications, inconsistencies, and an inadequate body of legal rights. Although today gay parentage remains at the forefront of the legal arena, there remains widespread unwillingness among courts and legislatures to stray from traditional notions of parentage, as well as stern
opposition to treating same-sex families with the same level of respect and equality as heterosexual or
‘normal’ families”).
2. Id.
3. Gary J. Gates, LGBT Parenting in the United States, WILLIAMS INST. 1, 3 (Feb. 2013), available at http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/LGBT-Parenting.pdf.
4. Id.
5. Id.
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6. Katherine A. West, Comment, Denying a Class of Adopted Children Equal Protection, 53
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 963, 968 (2013). However, there is a Uniform Adoption Act (UAA) drafted by
the Uniform Law Commission. The UAA lays out a set of proposed adoption laws, and many states
have modeled their adoption laws based on them. Adoption Act (1994) Summary, UNIF. LAW COMM’N,
http://www.uniformlaws.org/ActSummary.aspx?title=Adoption%20Act%20(1994) (last visited Jan. 22,
2015).
7. West, supra note 6, at 968.
8. LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 1221 (1991).
9. Adar v. Smith (Adar II), 639 F.3d 146, 149 (5th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 400
(2011).
10. Id.
11. Id. at 150.
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The absence of consistent adoption laws in the United States has resulted in states making their own adoption determinations.6 Many states
only allow adoptions by married couples or single unmarried persons, precluding unmarried couples from jointly adopting children.7 This is the current state of adoption law in Louisiana.8
In 2006, Louisiana’s Registrar of Vital Records and Statistics (the
Registrar) refused to reissue an accurate birth certificate for a Louisianaborn child adopted by same-sex parents residing in New York.9 The adoptive parents wanted their child’s birth certificate to reflect both of their
names. However, the Registrar insisted she could only include one of the
parents’ names since they were not married and Louisiana law does not
permit joint adoption of a child by unmarried parents.10 This led to Adar v.
Smith, a case in which the Fifth Circuit upheld the Registrar’s birth certificate policy, and the court decided that both the Full Faith and Credit Clause
and Equal Protection Clause claims brought by the adoptive parents
failed.11
This Comment seeks to demonstrate how the Fifth Circuit incorrectly
analyzed the adoptive parents’ equal protection claim and wrongly held
that the Registrar’s policy was constitutional. By denying accurate birth
certificates to out-of-state parents with legal parental status, Louisiana is
unnecessarily revisiting valid parentage determinations for no justifiable
reason. Louisiana has no legitimate interest in undermining the strength of
out-of-state parent-child relationships, but refusing to issue birth certificates with the names of both adoptive parents does just that. Consequently,
such a policy is constitutionally impermissible.
Part I of this Comment will detail the Adar court’s decision and the
circumstances that led up to its issuance. Part II will explain the importance
of birth certificates and the potential consequences that could come to the
adoptive children of same-sex parents who cannot obtain an accurate birth
certificate that includes the names of both parents. Finally, Part III will
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explore two different ways that the Registrar’s policy could be unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause: (1) the policy may burden a fundamental right stemming from family autonomy, or (2) it may discriminate
against out-of-state same-sex parents.
I. ADAR V. SMITH — LOUISIANA’S REGISTRAR REFUSES TO ISSUE A
BIRTH CERTIFICATE WITH THE NAMES OF BOTH SAME-SEX ADOPTIVE
PARENTS OF A LOUISIANA-BORN CHILD

03/25/2015 13:32:44

12. Adar v. Smith (Adar I), 597 F.3d 697, 701 (5th Cir. 2010), rev’d en banc, Adar v. Smith
(Adar II), 639 F.3d 146 (5th Cir. 2011).
13. Id.
14. Adar II, 639 F.3d at 149.
15. Adar I, 597 F.3d at 701.
16. Id. at 701–02; Adar II, 639 F.3d at 149–50; see LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:76(a), (c) (2012)
(“When a person born in Louisiana is adopted in a court of proper jurisdiction . . . the state registrar
may create a new record of birth” and “the state registrar shall make a new record in its archives, showing . . . [t]he names of the adoptive parents.”).
17. Adar I, 597 F.3d at 701–02.
18. Adar II, 639 F.3d at 150.
19. Id. at 151.
20. Id. at 150.
21. Id.
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Infant J was born in Shreveport, Louisiana in 2005.12 In April 2006,
Oren Adar and Mickey Ray Smith, a same-sex couple residing in Connecticut, obtained an adoption decree for Infant J through a New York family
court.13 The adoptive parents sought to have Infant J’s birth certificate
amended in Louisiana, substituting their names for those of the biological
parents.14 As advised by the State’s Attorney General, the Registrar refused
to honor their request and update the certificate.15 The Registrar cited a
Louisiana statute that said new records of birth could be issued to “adoptive
parents,” which the Registrar took to mean married parents.16 She interpreted the statute this way because Louisiana law dictates that only married
couples can jointly adopt a child.17 The Registrar did, however, offer to put
one of the parents’ names on the birth certificate because Louisiana allows
single-parent adoptions.18
Mickey and Oren sued the Registrar in federal court. They alleged that
the Registrar’s refusal to issue Infant J a new birth certificate violated both
the Full Faith and Credit Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the
United States Constitution.19 The district court found for the adoptive parents under the Full Faith and Credit Clause.20 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit
affirmed the district court’s decision, finding that Louisiana law required
the Registrar to reissue the birth certificate.21
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However, the Fifth Circuit then agreed to rehear the case en banc and
vacated their previous decision.22 In the court’s new decision, it reasoned
that amending Infant J’s birth certificate would not constitute recognition
of the adoption, but enforcement of it, and held that Mickey and Oren’s
valid New York adoption did not have to be “enforced” by the Registrar.23
Put differently, while the Registrar claimed to acknowledge Mickey and
Oren as Infant J’s legal parents, that parentage did not give them a right to
Louisiana’s primary method of parental identification—a birth certificate.24
The court reasoned that “birth certificates are merely ‘identity documents
that evidence . . . the existing parent-child relationships, but do not create
them.’”25 The court further stated that “no right created by the New York
adoption order . . . has been frustrated, as nothing in the order entitles Appellees to a particular type of birth certificate.”26 Finally, the court concluded that “Louisiana has a right to issue birth certificates in the manner it
deems fit,” which under current Louisiana law, does not include issuance to
unmarried adoptive parents.27
On October 11, 2011, the United States Supreme Court denied the
adoptive parents’ petition for writ of certiorari.28 This closed the door, at
least for now, on Infant J’s chance of receiving an accurate birth certificate.
The next part of this Comment will assess the implications of a policy that
prevents Infant J from acquiring an updated birth certificate inscribed with
both of his parents’ names.
II. AN ADOPTIVE CHILD’S BIRTH CERTIFICATE — WHAT’S IN A PIECE
OF PAPER?

03/25/2015 13:32:44

22. Id.
23. Id. at 159 (citing Baker v. General Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 235 (1998): “The states’ duty
to ‘recognize’ sister state judgments . . . does not compel states to ‘adopt the practices of other states
regarding the time, manner, and mechanisms for enforcing judgments.’”).
24. Adar II, 639 F.3d at 159.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 161.
28. Adar v. Smith, 132 S. Ct. 400 (2011).
29. See, e.g., Applying for a New License (Drivers 18+) in Louisiana, DMV.ORG
http://www.dmv.org/la-louisiana/apply-license.php (last visited Jan. 22, 2015) (“The [Office of Motor
Vehicles] recommends your birth certificate as a primary form and your Social Security card and a
payroll stub as secondary forms [of identification for applying for a driver’s license].”).

36219-ckt_90-2 Sheet No. 181 Side B

The average person probably does not think much about her birth certificate. Other than the rare instance where a person may need a second
form of identification, such as applying for a driver’s license,29 her birth
certificate is likely tucked away in a drawer collecting dust. But for chil-
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dren of same-sex parents, not having an accurate birth certificate can cause
unexpected complications.30 Some problems have already presented themselves to Mickey and Oren, such as issues with “[Mickey’s] ability to enroll
his son on his company health plan,” “the couple’s ability to enroll their
son [in] school,” and an incident where the couple was “stopped at an airport when airport personnel wanted proof of their relationship with the
child.”31
A. Birth Certificates Generally

03/25/2015 13:32:44

30. See discussion below in Parts II.A and II.B.
31. Adar v. Smith Case Background, LAMBDA LEGAL (Sept. 26, 2011),
http://www.lambdalegal.org/sites/default/files/publications/downloads/fs_adar-v-smith-casebackground_1.pdf.
32. Camilla Taylor, Accurate Birth Certificates Make Families Less Vulnerable, LAMBDA LEGAL
(Dec. 9, 2010), http://www.lambdalegal.org/news/oc_201012_accurate-birth-certificates.
33. Brief of Amici Curiae Professors of Law Joan Heifetz Hollinger, Courtney G. Joslin, Rhonda
Wasserman, et al. in Support of Petitioners at 3, Adar v. Smith, 639 F.3d 146 (5th Cir. 2011) (No. 0930036), 2011 WL 3533772, at *3 (hereinafter Brief of Amici Hollinger (2011)).
34. About Vital Records, STATE REGISTRAR & VITAL RECORDS,
http://new.dhh.louisiana.gov/index.cfm/page/648/n/234 (last visited Feb. 6, 2015).
35. See Brief of Amici Curiae Joan Heifetz Hollinger et. al. in Support of Plaintiff’s-Appellees
Oren Adar and Mickey Ray Smith and in Support of Affirmation at 6–7, Adar v. Smith, 591 F.Supp.2d
857 (E.D. La. 2008) (No. 09-30036), 2010 WL 5778048 (hereinafter Brief of Amici Hollinger (2010)).
36. Annette R. Appell, Certifying Identity, 42 CAP. U. L. REV. 361, 390 (2014).
37. Id. at 391.
38. Id. at 396.
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Birth certificates are government-issued documents32 that are “universally recognized as reliable proof of a child’s identity and parentage.”33 The
website for the Louisiana State Registrar & Vital Records describes birth
records as being “essential for just administration of [Louisiana] law and
for the protection of individual rights.”34 The birth certificates of adopted
children in Louisiana and other states must include the adopted child’s
name, date and place of birth, and the names of the adoptive parents.35
According to Professor Annette R. Appell of the Washington University Law School, “[b]y presenting the facts of birth, the birth certificate
creates and protects rights and disabilities for adults and children. It is
proof of a life and the rights that flow from that life.”36 She goes on to say
that a birth certificate creates “legal truth because it is the official record of
one’s identity. Attributes of this certificate of birth include belonging—
citizenship and family membership, with all of the attendant rights and
privileges and limitations.”37 She states that, “[m]ost fundamentally, the
birth certificate certifies and proves parenthood: the person or persons on
the birth certificate are the child’s legal parents.”38 Further, Appell asserts
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39. Id. at 395.
40. Id. at 393, 394.
41. Brief of Amici Hollinger (2011), supra note 33, at 12–13.
42. Id.
43. See Adar v. Smith Case Background, supra note 31.
44. Brief of Amici Hollinger (2011), supra note 33, at 12–13.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 12–14.
48. See Adar v. Smith Case Background, supra note 31.
49. Adoptions are finalized through a court order or adoption decree, which “establishes the legal
relationship between the child and his or her adoptive parent(s) and severs the legal relationship be-

36219-ckt_90-2 Sheet No. 182 Side B

that “[t]he birth certificate assigns, memorializes, and codifies the parentchild relationship as the law constructs it. This creates a range of protections, freedoms, benefits, and obligations for the parents and the child.”39
Children with inaccurate birth certificates can face challenges in establishing their identity and parentage.40 Birth certificates are routinely required as identification for children in a variety of situations. For example,
schools often need birth certificates for new student registration.41 Financial
institutions may require a birth certificate to conduct a financial transaction
for a minor child, such as setting up a bank account.42 Furthermore, in the
event of a separation or divorce between the adoptive parents, a birth certificate may help determine the future care, custody, and support of the
child.43
A birth certificate can also be important for traveling. The U.S. State
Department requires a birth certificate to issue a passport for children under
fourteen.44 Some countries even require a parent traveling with a minor
child to provide a birth certificate in addition to a passport.45
Additionally, birth certificates are often required to confirm the existence of a parent-child relationship in order for either party to receive various kinds of financial benefits. For instance, the U.S. government may
require a birth certificate to determine eligibility for surviving child Social
Security benefits.46 Insurance companies may need a birth certificate to
verify a child’s entitlement to a parent’s pension or other retirement benefits, or their eligibility as a beneficiary of a parent’s estate.47 As Mickey
and Oren experienced, a birth certificate may even be needed for a child to
gain the benefit of a parent’s health insurance plan.48
The above list is not exhaustive, but it paints a picture of the kinds of
struggles adoptive parents and children alike may suffer if an accurate birth
certificate is not obtainable. While it is true that, in most situations, adoptive parents have the option of establishing parentage through other means,
such as an adoption decree,49 the use of birth certificate alternatives can
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create additional problems.50 First, they may prevent a child from keeping
his or her adoption private and confidential, forcing them to “repeatedly
explain the circumstances of their adoption and the reasons why their birth
certificates are incomplete.”51 It is not a stretch of the imagination to assume that such explanations may have a negative impact on the affected
child. Not having an accurate birth certificate may also make a child feel as
if they are different from their peers since the vast majority of children and
parents have birth certificates.52 Moreover, “alternatives are more likely to
result in potentially harmful delays, bureaucratic complications and increased costs.”53 Birth certificates are universally recognized, whereas
adoption decrees may raise questions.54 Perhaps the most detrimental problem stemming from depending on birth certificate alternatives is that they
may be unavailable or unreliable in emergency situations where time is of
the essence, potentially causing physical harm to the child.55
B. In Case of Emergency

03/25/2015 13:32:44

tween the child and his or her biological parents. The decree also guarantees that the adoptive parent(s)
‘will be treated as parents for all legal purposes.’” West, supra note 6, at 970–71.
50. See Brief of Amici Hollinger (2011), supra note 33, at 14.
51. Id. at 12.
52. See id. at 11.
53. Id. at 14.
54. Brief of Amici Hollinger (2010), supra note 35, at 10.
55. See id.
56. See id. at 8–9.
57. Id.
58. Taylor, supra note 32.
59. See discussion in Parts B.1 and B.2.
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A law or policy that keeps a child of same-sex parents from having an
accurate birth certificate could have grave consequences for that child’s
safety and well-being.56 Harm might come to such a child if it takes additional time in a critical situation to determine parentage, delaying treatment
that could be lifesaving.57 Lambda Legal states that “[p]arents who don’t
have accurate birth certificates for their children have extra reason to dread
medical emergencies, fearing that doctors will delay a child’s emergency
treatment while trying to figure out whether a parent has authority to consent.”58 While such scenarios may seem farfetched, at least two cases
reached the courts after same-sex adoptive parents experienced precisely
this kind of heart-wrenching situation.59
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1. Finstuen v. Crutcher—Only the Mother Can Ride in the
Ambulance

03/25/2015 13:32:44

60. Finstuen v. Crutcher (Finstuen II), 496 F.3d 1139, 1142 (10th Cir. 2007).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Finstuen v. Edmondson (Finstuen I), 497 F. Supp. 2d 1295, 1301 (W.D. Ok. 2006), aff’d in
part, rev’d in part sub nom., Finstuen II, 496 F.3d at 1139.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Finstuen II, 496 F.3d at 1156.
69. Id. at 1154.
70. Id.
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In Finstuen v. Crutcher, three same sex-couples and their adopted
children challenged an Oklahoma statute that prohibited the state from
recognizing adoptions “by more than one individual of the same sex from
any other state or foreign jurisdiction.”60 Lucy and Jennifer Doel were one
of these couples.61 They adopted their Oklahoma-born child, “E,” in California.62 Oklahoma issued them a supplemental birth certificate listing only
Lucy as E’s parent, and denied their request to add Jennifer’s name to the
certificate.63
The Doels had a scary experience when E needed to be transported to
the emergency room via ambulance.64 The emergency medical technicians
said only the “mother” could ride in the ambulance, so Jennifer was not
allowed to ride with Lucy and E.65 Similarly, at first the emergency room
personnel would only allow Lucy in the room with their sick child.66 Jennifer was eventually allowed to be with E in her hospital room once the
hospital personnel understood that both she and Lucy were E’s parents.67
The Tenth Circuit in Finstuen found the challenged Oklahoma adoption statute unconstitutional, holding that the Full Faith and Credit Clause
required the Oklahoma State Department of Health to issue an updated
birth certificate to the Doels containing both parents’ names.68 The court
reasoned that, in recognizing the California adoption decree, Oklahoma
was required to give the Doels the same rights to which all Oklahoma
adoptive parents are entitled.69 Thus, “[i]f Oklahoma had no statute providing for the issuance of supplementary birth certificates for adopted children, the Doels could not invoke the Full Faith and Credit Clause in asking
Oklahoma for a new birth certificate.”70 However, because Oklahoma did
have such a statute in place, the state was required to issue the Doels an
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updated birth certificate just as they would do for any other adopting couple residing in Oklahoma71
The Fifth Circuit in Adar, recognizing that Finstuen was a similar
case, attempted to distinguish it. The Fifth Circuit insisted that Finstuen
and Adar are different because Finstuen dealt with a challenge to a statute
and Adar involved a challenge to the actions of an executive official.72
However, most believe that the Adar decision created a circuit split, including the Adar dissenters.73 The dissent in Adar stated that the Full Faith and
Credit Clause requires states to accord the judgments of sister states full
faith and credit, regardless of which branch of state government is involved.74
The alleged circuit split was created when the Fifth Circuit decided in
Adar that amending a birth certificate is considered an enforcement of a
sister state’s final judgment of adoption; doing so was only required if Louisiana would have issued the adoption under its own laws.75 Like Louisiana, Oklahoma does not permit joint adoption by unmarried persons.76 But
the Tenth Circuit found that amending a birth certificate according to Oklahoma’s law is recognition of another state’s judgment as required by the
Full Faith and Credit Clause.77 Under the Tenth Circuit’s reasoning, when
the Fifth Circuit in Adar claimed to honor the parentage of Oren and Mickey, but only put one parent’s name on the birth certificate, the Adar court
awarded only “half faith and credit” to their valid adoption decree.78
2. Gartner v. Iowa Department of Public Health—An Exhausting
Vigil

03/25/2015 13:32:44

71. Id.
72. Adar v. Smith (Adar II), 639 F.3d 146, 182 (5th Cir. 2011).
73. See, e.g., Drew Lambert, What Happens in Vegas New York, Stays in Vegas New York: A
Criticism of Adar v. Smith, 9 MOD. AM. 59 (2013); Joseph A. Fraioli, Note, Having Faith in Full Faith
& Credit: Finstuen, Adar, and the Quest for Interstate Same-Sex Parental Recognition, 98 IOWA L.
REV. 365 (2012); Lauren Lombardo, Note, Does Heather Have Two Mommies?: The Importance of
Full Faith and Credit Recognition for Adoptions By Same-Sex Couples, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1301
(2012).
74. Adar II, 639 F.3d at 182 (Wiener, J., dissenting).
75. Id. at 160–61.
76. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 7503.1-1 (West 2013).
77. Finstuen v. Crutcher (Finstuen II), 496 F.3d 1139, 1156 (10th Cir. 2007).
78. Adar II, 639 F.3d at 180 (Wiener, J., dissenting).
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Similarly, in Gartner v. Iowa Department of Public Health, Heather
Martin Gartner and Melissa Gartner challenged the state of Iowa’s refusal
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to issue an accurate birth certificate to their daughter, MacKenzie, which
listed both women as parents.79
Heather is MacKenzie’s biological mother, having conceived her
through anonymous donor insemination.80 The day after MacKenzie was
born, Heather and Melissa completed a hospital form for MacKenzie’s
birth certificate, but when they received the birth certificate it had only
Heather’s name.81 Heather and Melissa asked the Iowa Department of Public Health (the Department) to reissue the birth certificate with both of their
names, but the Department denied their request.82 The Department reasoned: “The system for registration of births in Iowa currently recognizes
the biological and ‘gendered’ roles of ‘mother’ and ‘father,’ grounded in
the biological fact that a child has one biological mother and one biological
father . . . .”83
Lambda Legal describes Heather and Melissa’s experience in 2010
when MacKenzie became seriously ill and was hospitalized in an intensive
care unit:
Heather maintained an exhausting vigil at Mackenzie’s bedside day and
night because Heather and Melissa both feared that, without an accurate
birth certificate, the hospital would not recognize Melissa as a parent and
permit her to make decisions or even remain with Mackenzie if an emergency occurred in Heather’s absence. Later, when Mackenzie needed a
surgical procedure, Heather had to take time off from work to be present
during the procedure and Mackenzie’s complete recovery even though
Melissa, as the stay-at-home parent, was available to care for Mackenzie
and the couple would have preferred to avoid having Heather miss as
much work. These stresses and frustrations compounded the anxiety the
family already felt over their infant’s terrifying illness.84

03/25/2015 13:32:44

79. Gartner v. Iowa Dep’t of Pub. Health, 830 N.W.2d 335, 341–42 (Iowa 2013).
80. Id. at 341.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 341–42.
83. Id. at 342.
84. Taylor, supra note 32.
85. Gartner, 830 N.W.2d at 354. However, it is important to note that in making their decision in
Gartner, the Iowa Supreme Court considered the special protections they had previously afforded to
homosexuals in Iowa. Specifically, the court in Varnum v. Brien held that classifications based on
sexual orientation must be analyzed under a heightened level of scrutiny and determined that same-sex
couples could not be excluded from civil marriages in Iowa. 763 N.W.2d 862, 896, 907 (Iowa 2009).
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The Iowa Supreme Court in Gartner found that, under Iowa’s equal
protection clause, the statute allowing only “the name of the husband” to
appear on the birth certificate was unconstitutional when applied to a married lesbian couple who had a child born to them during their marriage.85
In the emergency situations the Doels and Gartners faced, what if the
legally recognized parent had not been present? The parent whose name
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was not listed on the birth certificate may have been unable to exercise her
parental right to make medical decisions on behalf of her minor child. This
frightening reality is one no parent should ever have to face, and yet Mickey and Oren are doing just that each day Infant J goes without an accurate
birth certificate.
III. DENYING RECOGNIZED PARENTS ACCURATE BIRTH
CERTIFICATES FOR THEIR ADOPTIVE CHILDREN RESULTS IN A VIOLATION
OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 685, 812 (4th ed.
Id. at 685.
Id.
Id. at 687–88.
Id. at 687, 812.
Id. at 688.
Id.
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90.
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Many papers have focused on the circuit split created by the Adar
court regarding its interpretation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause as that
clause relates to adoption judgments. But few have examined the ways in
which Mickey and Oren were denied equal protection when they could not
obtain an accurate birth certificate for Infant J. The Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that “[n]o State . . . shall deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”86 Equal
protection issues can arise either when a law discriminates against or disadvantages a class of individuals, or when a law interferes with the exercise
of a fundamental right.87 Legal challenges based on equal protection require the government to identify a sufficiently important objective for its
discriminatory law.88 What is sufficient depends on the type of discrimination involved.89
When analyzing equal protection claims, courts traditionally apply one
of three levels of review.90 The level of review applied depends on the type
of classification used, though in the case of fundamental rights courts typically use the least deferential level of review.91 The lowest level of review,
and the most deferential to the legislature, is the rational basis test.92 Under
the rational basis test, the challenged law will be upheld as long as it is
rationally related to any legitimate government interest.93 With such a low
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bar, laws are rarely declared unconstitutional for failure to show a rational
basis.94
In certain situations, courts will apply one of the two more exacting
levels of scrutiny. The middle level of review is intermediate scrutiny.95
Under intermediate scrutiny, a law will be upheld only if it is substantially
related to an important government interest.96 Courts have applied this level
of review in cases dealing with discrimination based on classifications of
gender and discrimination against nonmarital children (previously referred
to as illegitimacy).97
The highest and least deferential level of review is strict scrutiny.98 To
survive strict scrutiny, a law must be necessary to achieve a compelling
governmental interest, and it must be narrowly tailored to achieve its intended result.99 One of the most difficult challenges for the government is
that it must show it could not achieve its objective through less restrictive
alternatives.100 Courts apply strict scrutiny when there is discrimination
based on race or national origin, or when the government burdens a fundamental right, such as the right to access the courts.101 When a fundamental
right is at issue, the question involves whether the government has a sufficient purpose for discrimination as to who can exercise the right.102
A. The Adar Majority and Dissent Disagree Over How to Analyze the
Equal Protection Clause Claim

03/25/2015 13:32:44

94. Id.
95. Id. at 687.
96. Id.
97. Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456 (1988); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 87.
98. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 87, at 687.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 687, 812.
102. Id. at 813.
103. Adar v. Smith (Adar II), 639 F.3d 146, 161–62 (5th Cir. 2011). Note, however, that the
dissent thought they should not have ruled on the equal protection claim considering the district court
never addressed it. The dissent wrote, “The only time we should ever reach an issue that was not first
decided in the district court is when such issue presents a pure question of law the ‘proper resolution [of
which] . . . is beyond any doubt.’ [] I respectfully disagree with the en banc majority’s conclusion that
the proper resolution of Appellees’ Equal Protection Clause claim is purely legal and its resolution is
beyond doubt.” Id. at 183 (Wiener, J., dissenting).

36219-ckt_90-2 Sheet No. 185 Side B

Although most of the Adar court’s opinion focuses on the adoptive
parents’ full faith and credit claim, the court also ruled on their equal protection claim.103 The court’s characterization of the adoptive parents’ argument was that “Louisiana treats a subset of children—adoptive children
of unmarried parents—differently from adopted children with married
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Id. at 161.
Id. at 161–62.
Id. at 162.
Id. at 183–86 (Wiener, J., dissenting).
Id. at 184.
Id. (emphasis removed).
Id.
Id. at 184–85.
Id.
Id. at 185 (Wiener, J., dissenting).
Id.
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parents, and this differential treatment does not serve any legitimate governmental interest.”104 The court did not adopt a form of heightened scrutiny and instead analyzed the claim under traditional rational basis review.105
The court concluded that the Louisiana law did not run afoul of the Equal
Protection Clause because Louisiana has a “legitimate interest in encouraging a stable and nurturing environment for the education and socialization
of its adopted children,” and “Louisiana may rationally conclude that having parenthood focused on a married couple or single individual . . . furthers the interests of adopted children.”106
The dissent in Adar strongly disagreed with the en banc majority’s
analysis of the equal protection claim.107 The dissent noted that the adoptive parents were not challenging Louisiana’s adoption laws or policies, but
were challenging the Registrar’s policy of denying them an accurate birth
certificate.108 Because of this, the dissent argued, “the governmental interest served by [the Registrar’s] refusal to issue a birth certificate reflecting
both unmarried out-of-state adoptive parents must extend beyond a defense
of Louisiana’s adoption laws.”109 The dissent further opined that because
the Registrar did not deny the birth certificate until well after Infant J was
adopted by Mickey and Oren, the Registrar’s action could not be rationally
related to the potential stability of Infant J’s home.110
The dissent also took issue with the majority’s Equal Protection
Clause comparator.111 The majority deemed married non-biological parents
to be the relevant comparator class to unmarried non-biological parents
such as Mickey and Oren.112 The dissent argued that the correct comparator
should be unmarried biological parents.113 The dissent pointed out that,
“[b]y statute, Louisiana recognizes and issues birth certificates to unmarried biological parents, irrespective of its proffered policy preference that
children only have parents who are married to one another.”114 Further, the
dissent noted that “nothing in this provision conditions issuance of such
birth certificates on the biological parents’ maintaining a common

36219-ckt_90-2 Sheet No. 186 Side B
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home.”115 Under Louisiana law, an unmarried couple is statutorily entitled
to a birth certificate for their biological child that includes both parents’
names, regardless of whether they live together.116 The only prerequisite is
that they verify the information on the birth certificate, which is parallel to
Louisiana’s prerequisite of a certified copy of an out-of-state adoption decree for obtaining a corrected Louisiana birth certificate.117 The dissent’s
contention was that Louisiana does not have a legitimate governmental
interest for treating unmarried, non-biological adoptive parents and unmarried, biological parents differently for the purpose of issuing birth certificates with two parents listed.118
B. Mickey and Oren’s Equal Protection Claim can be Analyzed Based
on Denial of a Fundamental Right or as Discrimination Based on
Classification

03/25/2015 13:32:44

115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 185–86.
119. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
120. See, e.g., Zablocki, 435 U.S. at 388–89 (stating that “We may accept for present purposes that
these are legitimate and substantial interests, but, since the means selected by the State for achieving
these interests unnecessarily impinge on the right to marry, the statute cannot be sustained.”).
121. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
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To date, the Supreme Court has not held that gays and lesbians are a
suspect class triggering strict scrutiny, but that does not mean Mickey and
Oren’s equal protection claim automatically fails. This section presents two
other ways a court could analyze the adoptive parents’ equal protection
claim.
First, the Court has found in the past that state interference with family
autonomy can infringe on a fundamental right, thus requiring some kind of
heightened scrutiny.119 The rigid nature of the scrutiny question works well
in some legal contexts, but it has been followed less stringently in the family law context.120 Certainly, recent constitutional doctrine regarding samesex couples reinforces the idea that the levels of scrutiny are less rigid
when applied to family law.121 Because not having an accurate birth certificate may affect family decision-making and infringe on the parent/child
relationship, the Registrar’s policy might fit into this category of case law.
Second, while the majority in Adar used traditional rational basis review, a very deferential legal standard, the dissent seemed to be hinting at
something less deferential, even while using the language of rational ba-
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sis.122 The Supreme Court has used this same approach before to strike
down laws discriminating against gays and lesbians where the Court felt it
was inappropriate to formally use a heightened level of scrutiny.123 Even
though the Registrar’s policy is not discriminatory on its face, if it nonetheless effectively discriminates against gays and lesbians, it is likely unconstitutional.
Viewing Adar through either or both of these equal protection lenses
leads to the conclusion that denying Mickey and Oren an accurate birth
certificate for Infant J was a violation of their constitutional rights under
the Equal Protection Clause.
1. Too Much State Interference with the Fundamental Rights That
Flow From the Parent-Child Relationship Requires a More Rigorous
Scrutiny

03/25/2015 13:32:44

122. Adar II, 639 F.3d at 183–84 (Wiener, J., dissenting).
123. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. at 620.
124. Under Louisiana law, unmarried couples living in Louisiana cannot jointly adopt a child,
which means they cannot obtain legal parental status. It thus follows that Louisiana’s policy of not
issuing birth certificates to unmarried parents with parental status can only apply to out-of-state parents.
125. Adar II, 639 F.3d at 159.
126. See Appell, supra note 36, at 390 (“[T]he birth certificate certifies and proves parenthood: the
person or persons on the birth certificate are the child’s legal parents.”).
127.
An adoption proceeding ends an initial legally-recognized (and enforceable) parent-child relationship and replaces it with an entirely new legal parent-child relationship. In the law, with
the exception of step-child adoptions, the new parent-child relationship attaches to the adoptive parents and child as if the child were born of the adoptive parents. The former relationship (in most jurisdictions) is treated as if it had never existed.
Adoption Act (1994) Summary, supra note 6.
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Louisiana’s policy of refusing to provide accurate birth certificates to
out-of-state parents who already have parental status denies those parents
equal protection. Because anyone in Louisiana who has parental status can
obtain an accurate birth certificate, the only people to whom this policy
applies are out-of-state adoptive parents and their children.124 The Fifth
Circuit argued that denying Mickey and Oren a birth certificate with both
their names did not affect their parental status.125 But in everyday practice,
birth certificates create a presumption of parent-child relationships.126 This
is particularly true for adoptive parents who have no biological link to their
children and thus are keenly aware of how important the legal designation
of parenthood is.127 When Louisiana chooses not to issue accurate birth
certificates to these out-of-state parents, Louisiana revisits valid parentage
determinations and undermines them.
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CHEMERINSKY, supra note 87, at 812–13.
262 U.S. 390 (1923).
Id. at 400–01.
Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
321 U.S. 158, 161–63 (1944).
Id. at 166.
406 U.S. 205, 208–13 (1972).
Id. at 232.
530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000).
Id. at 72–73.
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The Equal Protection Clause is usually invoked when a law interferes
with a fundamental right,128 and many rights associated with the family are
characterized as fundamental. In 1923, the Supreme Court in Meyer v. Nebraska defined liberty in broad terms to include the rights “to marry” and
“to establish a home and bring up children.”129 In Meyer, the Court found
that a statute that forbade teaching any language except English in schools
interfered “with the power of parents to control the education of their own
[children].”130 Two years later, the Court similarly invalidated a state law
that required children to attend public schools.131
In 1944, the Court heard Prince v. Massachusetts. In Prince, a child
who was a Jehovah’s Witness distributed religious literature alongside her
aunt and legal custodian, contrary to the Massachusetts child labor laws.132
The Court stated, “It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture
of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom
include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder.”133 Fast-forward to Wisconsin v. Yoder in 1972, where the Court considered whether Amish parents were required to send their children to
school past the 8th grade in keeping with compulsory attendance laws.134
Although the case was primarily about free exercise of religion, Yoder did
discuss parental rights, expressing that it is “the fundamental interest of
parents . . . to guide the religious future and education of their children.”135
More recently, in Troxel v. Granville, a plurality of the Court discussed the long recognized “fundamental right of parents to make decisions
concerning the care, custody, and control of their children.”136 Specifically,
the Troxel Court held that a state cannot “infringe on the fundamental right
of parents to make child rearing decisions simply because [someone acting
on behalf of the] state [] believes a ‘better’ decision could be made.”137
Even with the many examples available, the precise scope of fundamental rights dealing with family autonomy is not clear. It is unlikely that
there is a fundamental right to an accurate birth certificate. However, the
interference with the parent-child relationship caused by denying an accu-
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rate birth certificate to recognized parents seems to fit within the familial
rights that courts have already afforded some level of constitutional protection. Specifically, Louisiana’s policy may burden fundamental rights associated with both parents and children.
a. The Constitutional Rights of the Adoptive Parents

See Brief of Amici Hollinger (2010), supra note 35, at 8.
See, e.g., Finstuen v. Edmondson (Finstuen I), 497 F. Supp. 2d 1295, 1301 (W.D. Ok. 2006).
See id.
See, e.g., Taylor, supra note 32.
See, e.g., Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 375.
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Louisiana’s policy is an unconstitutional restriction on the rights of
out-of-state recognized parents. As discussed earlier in this Comment, not
having access to an accurate birth certificate in emergency medical situations can lead to scenarios where a parent is unable to exercise her right to
make medical decisions on behalf of her child.138 In some instances, the
parent may not even be allowed to be present with her child in an ambulance or hospital room.139 These practices evidence a clear denial of quintessential parental decision-making “concerning the care, custody and
control” of one’s child.140
More generally, adoptive parents who do not have accurate birth certificates for their children may feel as if they need to live their lives differently.141 They may worry about traveling across state lines or
internationally, constantly calculating the risks of being in a situation where
having a birth certificate with both parents’ names might make a difference, even while taking the extra step to always have their adoption judgment on hand. By effectively requiring out-of-state recognized parents to
go through this more onerous process to ensure that their decision-making
regarding their child is honored, Louisiana’s policy interferes with family
autonomy.
Further, a parallel can be drawn between birth certificates and marriage licenses. When laws have interfered with a person’s ability to obtain a
marriage license, courts have routinely found a fundamental right triggering heightened scrutiny.142 For example, in Zablocki v. Redhail, a Wisconsin statute made it illegal for residents with support obligations to
noncustodial children to obtain a marriage license unless they could show,
among other things, that they were complying with those obligations.143
The Supreme Court found that the state could not interfere with the plaintiff’s ability to obtain a marriage license just because he was in arrears on
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144. Id. at 386.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 388.
147. Turner, 482 U.S. at 81–82.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 95.
150. Id. at 99.
151. See Adoption Act (1994) Summary, supra note 6.
152. See, e.g., U.S. LEGAL FORMS, LOUISIANA PATERNITY FORMS, DOCUMENTS AND LAW,
http://www.uslegalforms.com/paternity/louisiana-paternity-forms.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2015)
(“With science giving us more accurate testing, the matter of establishing paternity is easier and more
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his child support.144 The Court held the ability to obtain a marriage license
in the same esteem as other fundamental rights, including “decisions relating to procreation, childbirth, child rearing, and family relationships.”145
Because the law interfered with a fundamental right, the Court invoked
heightened scrutiny and decided that the statute was neither supported by
sufficiently important state interests, nor closely tailored to effectuate those
interests.146
The Court has also been willing to protect the right to obtain a marriage license for prison inmates. In Turner v. Safley, prisoners at the Renz
Correctional Institution in Missouri filed suit over a regulation that permitted an inmate to get a marriage license only with permission of the prison
superintendent.147 Permission would only be granted if there were compelling reasons to do so (e.g., a pregnancy or the birth of an illegitimate
child).148 Following Zablocki, the Court again found that denial of a marriage license warranted heightened scrutiny.149 The Court looked to see if
the prison’s marriage regulation was reasonably related to penological interests and found that it was not.150
It is true that Zablocki and Turner are not perfect analogies for the
case at hand. The plaintiffs petitioning for marriage licenses in Zablocki
and Turner did not have marital status without a license whereas Mickey
and Oren do have parental status without an accurate birth certificate.
However, it is the pieces of paper themselves that are the key. Marriage
licenses and birth certificates function in an analogous way. The state decision to issue a marriage license cements the spousal relationship. Similarly,
the state decision to issue a birth certificate with the names of a child’s
parents cements the parent-child relationship, perhaps especially for adoptive parents, who depend on the state to create and legalize their parentage
in the first place.151
While states do need some freedom to restrict whose name can be on a
birth certificate—for example, requiring proof of a genetic connection before including a name on a birth certificate152—it does not make sense for a
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state to deny birth certificates to already recognized parents. States certainly have a legitimate interest in requiring some degree of proof of whose
name should be included on a birth certificate. But once proof of parentage
has been procured, states no longer have an interest in preventing a parent
from putting his or her name on the certificate. Louisiana’s policy infringes
on the rights of out-of-state adoptive parents and should be subject to a
more rigorous scrutiny for interfering with family autonomy.
Under heightened scrutiny, Louisiana’s policy should be struck down.
Denying out-of-state recognized adoptive parents access to accurate birth
certificates for their children is not substantially related to Louisiana’s purported government interest of family stability. As discussed, Louisiana’s
policy forces out-of-state parents to jump through additional hoops before
making important decisions on behalf of their children. This has the ironic
effect of undermining family stability instead of preserving it.
b. The Constitutional Rights of the Adoptive Children

The statute of illegitimacy has expressed through the ages society’s condemnation of irresponsible liaisons beyond the bonds of marriage. But

03/25/2015 13:32:44

reliable than in the past. DNA testing methods include SWAB Test and DNA Genetic Identity. . . . The
Father will be shown on the birth certificate if he acknowledges paternity when or close in time to the
birth, or the Court orders the birth certificate to be changed to reflect the Fathers name.”).
153. As discussed earlier, there are two ways to trigger heightened scrutiny in an equal protection
claim—either by arguing a fundamental right has been infringed upon, or where an equal protection
question involves a suspect class. Here I am arguing that a fundamental right is at issue, not that Mickey
and Oren are members of a suspect class. See supra Part III.
154. 486 U.S. 456 (1988).
155. Id. at 461.
156. Id.
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Louisiana’s policy is also an unconstitutional infringement on the
rights of the adoptive children of out-of-state unmarried parents. Cases
dealing with discrimination against nonmarital—”illegitimate”—children
provide a useful comparison. It is important to note that the illegitimacy
cases look at nonmarital children as a suspect class while this analysis is
focusing on fundamental rights.153 Despite that difference, there are important principles to derive from the illegitimacy cases.
In Clark v. Jeter, the Supreme Court held unconstitutional a state law
that required that actions to establish paternity of a nonmarital child must
be commenced within six years of birth.154 The Court established that intermediate scrutiny is appropriate for cases dealing with discrimination of
this type.155 Their justification for scrutiny of that level was that it is unfair
to penalize children for their parents’ actions outside of marriage.156 In
Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Company, the Court stated:

36219-ckt_90-2 Sheet No. 189 Side B

03/25/2015 13:32:44

11P - DAVOODI FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

722

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

3/19/2015 3:13 PM

[Vol 90:2

visiting this condemnation on the head of an infant is illogical and unjust. Moreover, imposing disabilities on the illegitimate child is contrary
to the basic concept of our system that legal burdens should bear some
relationship to individual responsibility or wrongdoing. Obviously, no
child is responsible for his birth and penalizing the illegitimate child is
an ineffectual—as well as an unjust—way of deterring the parent.157
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157. 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972).
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The same line of reasoning is applicable when Louisiana uses its policy of refusing to issue accurate birth certificates to recognized out-of-state
parents as a disincentive to adopt and raise children outside of marriage.
First, as discussed above, Louisiana has a legitimate interest in regulating
who is a parent in Louisiana, but Louisiana does not have a legitimate interest in undermining the parentage of an out-of-state couple. Second, Louisiana’s policy could cause real harm to adopted children, effectively
“penalizing” them for their parents’ choice to adopt them without getting
married first.
At the most basic level, not having an accurate birth certificate may
cause adopted children to feel even more different than they already may
feel as a result of being adopted. If a child’s parents must use birth certificate alternatives, such as an adoption decree, to register the child for
school, for instance, that draws attention to the child’s adoption instead of
keeping it confidential. Then there is the physical harm that may come to a
child in an emergency, or the confusion and fear a child may feel if one of
her parents is not allowed to accompany her in a scary ambulance ride or
hospital room. The illegitimacy cases suggest that if Louisiana’s policy
leads to these kinds of consequences it should be subject to intermediate
scrutiny.
Applying intermediate scrutiny, a policy that denies unmarried adoptive parents access to accurate birth certificates for their adoptive children
is not substantially related to the important government interest of family
stability for adopted children and their parents, contrary to Louisiana’s
claim. In the first place, as the illegitimacy cases indicate, courts are particularly concerned about policies that harm children for the sake of regulating the sexual behavior of their parents. Further, even if Louisiana’s
purported interest in family stability is important, denying birth certificates
to out-of-state unmarried adoptive parents is not substantially related to
such an interest because Louisiana is not capable of keeping anyone, except
for Louisiana citizens, from becoming parents. Specifically, Mickey and
Oren had already adopted Infant J at the time they applied for the corrected
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birth certificate, so Louisiana’s policy had no bearing on the supposed stability of Infant J’s family.
Setting aside Louisiana’s purported purpose, the only purpose left
standing is to send a message to unmarried adoptive parents that they are
unequal to married adoptive parents. If denial of an accurate birth certificate is important enough to rise to the level of constitutional protection,
then a purpose to treat unmarried adoptive parents differently from married
ones is not substantially related to the state interest of family stability, and
the policy is unconstitutional.
2. Beneath the Surface, Louisiana’s Policy Boils Down to Animus
against Gays and Lesbians
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158. See, e.g., United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620
(1996).
159. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 404 (1975) (“[D]omestic relations [is] an area [of law] that has
long been regarded as a virtually exclusive province of the States”).
160. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 87, at 696.
161. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2675; Romer, 517 U.S. at 620.
162. Romer, 517 U.S. at 623–24.
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Even if a court declines to analyze the ability to obtain an accurate
birth certificate under a theory of fundamental rights, case law suggests that
laws that treat gays and lesbians as second-class citizens are subject to a
higher level of scrutiny than rational basis review.158 For the sake of argument, assume that Louisiana may have a legitimate interest in not allowing
same-sex couples that live in Louisiana to adopt. Historically, states have
the power to regulate who gets to be a parent and how they can become
one.159 However, it is something entirely different to say that Louisiana has
a legitimate interest in refusing to provide birth certificates to recognized
same-sex parents from other states.
There have been times in the Supreme Court’s history where the Court
chose not to formally apply heightened scrutiny, but its equal protection
analysis did not conform to the traditional, low-level rational basis scrutiny.
This kind of analysis can be described as rational basis plus—though the
Court uses the language of rational basis, the review has more bite to it.160
Notably, the Court has applied versions of rational basis plus reasoning in
two different cases dealing with discrimination against gays and lesbians—
Romer v. Evans and United States v. Windsor.161
Romer challenged an amendment to the Colorado constitution that
prohibited “all legislative, executive or judicial action . . . designed to protect . . . homosexual persons.”162 Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority,
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163. Id. at 627.
164. Id. at 631–32.
165. Id. at 635.
166. Id. at 640–41 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“It is unsurprising that the Court avoids discussion of
[whether there was a legitimate rational basis for the substance of the constitutional amendment], since
the answer is so obviously yes.”).
167. Id. at 635.
168. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2683 (2013).
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 2684.
174. Id. at 2693–96. The Second Circuit laid out its analysis under the Equal Protection Clause,
finding that gays and lesbians are a quasi-suspect class deserving of heightened scrutiny. Using inter-
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described the amendment as a sweeping change in legal status for gays and
lesbians, stripping only them of “specific legal protection from the injuries
caused by discrimination.”163
The Court said it would only uphold the amendment if it bore a rational relation to some legitimate end, and then admonished that the amendment “fails, indeed defies, even this conventional inquiry.”164 The main
rationale Colorado offered for the amendment was “respect for citizens’
freedom of association, [particularly] the liberties of landlords or employers who have personal or religious objections to homosexuality.”165 Regular
rational basis review is so deferential to state objectives that under it, such
a rationale would almost certainly have been acceptable.166 But the Court
refused to credit Colorado’s rationale as legitimate and held that the
amendment “classifies homosexuals not to further a proper legislative end
but to make them unequal to everyone else.”167
The recent case United States v. Windsor seemed to apply a similar
heightened rational basis review, at least in part. In 2007, Edith Windsor
and Thea Spyer, residents of New York, traveled to Toronto to marry.168
The couple’s home state of New York recognized their same-sex marriage.169 In 2009, Thea passed away, leaving her entire estate to Edith.170
However, because Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) defined marriage as being between a man and a woman only, Edith was required by law to pay taxes on the estate that she would have been exempt
from if she were in a heterosexual marriage.171 In 2010, Edith filed suit in
federal district court, seeking a declaration that Section 3 of DOMA was
unconstitutional because it violated the Equal Protection Clause.172
The district court found for Edith and the Second Circuit affirmed.173
The Supreme Court, in an opinion also authored by Justice Kennedy, upheld the Second Circuit’s decision, but laid out different reasoning.174 The
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Court used a combination of federalism, liberty, and equal protection arguments in holding that Section 3 of DOMA was unconstitutional.175
Much like in Romer, the Court’s equal protection arguments applied a
less deferential form of rational basis to invalidate DOMA.176 Justice Kennedy wrote:
DOMA instructs all federal officials, and indeed all persons with whom
same-sex couples interact, including their own children, that their marriage is less worthy than the marriages of others. The federal statute is
invalid, for no legitimate purpose overcomes the purpose and effect to
disparage and to injure those whom the State, by its marriage laws,
sought to protect in personhood and dignity.177

03/25/2015 13:32:44

mediate scrutiny, the court held that DOMA was not substantially related to an important governmental
interest, and thus was unconstitutional. Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 2012).
175. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693–96.
176. See id. at 2706–07 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[E]ven setting aside traditional moral disapproval
of same-sex marriage (or indeed same-sex sex), there are many perfectly valid . . . justifying rationales
for this legislation. Their existence ought to be the end of this case.”).
177. Id. at 2696.
178. See 1 U.S.C.A § 7 (1996).
179. See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2706 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
180. Id. at 2693–94.
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Unlike the statute in Romer, DOMA was not discriminatory on its face, as
it sought to traditionally define marriage without mentioning gays and lesbians at all.178 Yet the majority seemed to believe DOMA’s discriminatory
purpose and effects were so egregious that they required a more rigorous
scrutiny than traditional rational basis review.179
Romer and Windsor suggest that gays and lesbians, as a class, are deserving of some kind of special protection, even though that protection has
not yet risen to the level of officially labeling gays and lesbians as a suspect
class. The question, then, is whether Louisiana’s birth certificate policy is
making an inappropriate distinction between gays and lesbians and everyone else. Louisiana’s denial of accurate birth certificates does not apply to
any Louisiana couples that have established parentage. The policy only
denies birth certificates to out-of-state couples who have already adopted a
child and been granted parentage by a different state. Refusing to issue
birth certificates to recognized parents creates “second-class” parental status for these individuals and “humiliates tens of thousands of children now
being raised by same-sex couples,” which the Windsor majority already
found to be impermissible.180
On its face, Louisiana’s policy appears to have nothing to do with discrimination against gays and lesbians and everything to do with ensuring
only married individuals can jointly adopt children. Louisiana focuses on
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181. Out-of-state unmarried straight couples can choose to get married and have those marriages
recognized under Louisiana law. Out-of-state unmarried same-sex couples lack this option. See LA.
CONST. art. XII, § 15.
182. Id. (“Marriage in the state of Louisiana shall consist only of the union of one man and one
woman.”).
183. U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973).
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the fact that the Registrar’s policy equally affects unmarried heterosexual
couples. In doing so, however, Louisiana ignores the reality that heterosexual individuals have the opportunity to marry under Louisiana law (and
indeed, under the laws of every state), thus giving heterosexual couples the
option to circumvent the policy.181 Same-sex couples, on the other hand,
are not permitted to marry under Louisiana law.182 Because out-of-state
adoptive parents who are heterosexual and married have their adoptions
recognized, gays and lesbians are left feeling that the Louisiana law is punishing them as parents.
A belief in family stability and the superiority of bi-gender parenting
may be an acceptable rationale for Louisiana’s government in creating
policies that solely govern citizens of Louisiana. But Mickey and Oren do
not live in Louisiana, and the birth certificate policy is only ever applied to
out-of-state parents. Denying such parents accurate birth certificates is a
completely ineffective way to ensure that children are raised in heterosexual households or to keep gays and lesbians from becoming parents. Louisiana generally cites family stability as a legitimate state interest for its
policy, but by the time couples like Mickey and Oren contact Louisiana’s
Registrar for birth certificates, they have already been legally deemed the
parents of their adoptive child. Family stability cannot possibly be rationally related to this policy when Louisiana is incapable of keeping any other
state’s citizens from becoming parents. Additionally, Louisiana certainly
cannot argue that there is a legitimate state interest in undermining the
strength of out-of-state parent-child relationships (the only thing this policy
seems to actually accomplish).
Stripped of its façade, the Registrar’s policy boils down to nothing but
animus against gays and lesbians, the only class of parents who are denied
a birth certificate under its policy. It is well established that “a
bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a
legitimate governmental interest.”183 Under a more biting rational basis
review, such as the type of scrutiny employed by the Supreme Court in
both Romer and Windsor, the Registrar’s policy unconstitutionally discriminates against gay and lesbian parents in general and specifically denies
Mickey and Oren equal protection of the laws.
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184. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2675.
185. Id. at 2694.
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Birth certificates are more than mere pieces of paper to the adopted
children of same-sex couples. In deciding Adar, the Fifth Circuit should
have kept in mind the unique importance that an accurate birth certificate
can have for adopted children and their parents. The fundamental rights
that stem from the parent-child relationship and the established need to
protect gays and lesbians from laws aimed to deny them dignity suggest
that laws that infringe on the parental rights of gays and lesbians should be
subject to some form of heightened scrutiny.
Even if neither equal protection argument made in this Comment is
persuasive standing alone, the two arguments taken collectively indicate
that something is just not right with Louisiana’s birth certificate policy.
There is precedent for this kind of global approach in Windsor. Justice
Kennedy used the language of equal protection, due process, and federalism in describing why Section 3 of DOMA was unconstitutional.184 While
Justice Kennedy seemed hesitant to anchor his holding in any one of the
three doctrines alone, he made clear that something was amiss with
DOMA.
“Under DOMA,” he wrote for the majority, “same-sex married couples have their lives burdened, by reason of government decree, in visible
and public ways. By its great reach, DOMA touches many aspects of married and family life, from the mundane to the profound.”185 Viewing Louisiana’s policy through a wider, more comprehensive lens leads to the same
conclusion—denying accurate birth certificates to recognized out-of-state
adoptive parents impermissibly burdens the families involved, affecting
them in a variety of ways, and is of no legitimate interest to the state.
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